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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT.E OF UTAH
UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT
001\TPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.-

Case
No.10165

C.\HPETS. INCORPORATED,
Def enda.nt-.A. p·p·ellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This was a trial conducted before the District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, before the Honorable· Ray
\?an Cott and a. jury in which the plaintiff sought recovery for damages due to an alleged breach of warranty,
said warranty being an express warranty against
''latent defects, faulty material and/or workmanship"
(R-7, Exhibit 2), said breach of warranty consisting soleI:~ and exclusively of a discoloration of draperies furnished by the defendant to the plaintiff, which as claimed
by the plaintiff changed their color as noted in the pre-

1
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trial order "from white to variegated colors" (R-12).
Plaintiff's complaint sought damages in the amount of
$7,500.00.

DISPOSITION BEFORE A TRIAL COURT
The matter was tried to a jury on April15 through
17, 1964, and a verdict was returned by the jury in favor
of the plaintiff in the amount of $3,750.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant made a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim
at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence (R-200). It renewed said motion again at the time the rna tter was submitted to the jury, together with a motion for a directed verdict (R-270-271). Following the return of the
verdict, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, for dismissal and for a new trial (R-43).
During trial, defendant also moved for the exclusion
of some testimony, took exception to argument of counsel and requested that the matter he re-submitted to the
jury, they having left the- jury box at the time the motion
was made. The court denied or refused all of the abovementioned motions, the motion for directed verdict, dismissal and new trial being argued before the court on
May 11, 1964, and the court's minute entry noting the
order and denial was then entered (R-46). From such
order and judgment the defendant appeals.
2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to a written subcontract (Exhibit 1), defendant ag-reed to furnish the plaintiff with certain fini~ht-d draperies to be hung in 100 apartment units then
under eon~tn1etion by plaintiff, known as the ''Susan Kay
.\rms" (see Exhibit 11). Said draperies were deliven'd and in~tnlled in plaintiff's apartment houses as they
wPre completed during the time period beginning Octoher 1961, and ending May 1962. At the conclusion of the
installation and at the time of final payment, which ocem-red sometime in June 1962, defendant executed a writtl'll guarantee or warranty titled ''Susan Kay Arms
Guarantee" (Exhibit 2). This document reaffirms the
provisions of paragraph 13 in the original subcontract
rPlating to "latent defects, faulty material and/or workman~hip" and extends the guarantee as being valid and
binding until after the "one year inspection by the FedPral Housing Commissioner covering the one year guaranteP period." Said one year inspection by the F. H. A.
Commissioner was made on September 16, 1963 (R-85),
and a 'vritten report on said inspection or a photostatic
copy thereof was introduced in evidence as Exhibit 5
(R-84). The warranty period in issue, therefore, was up
to and including September 16, 1963, as identified in the
Instruction No. 2 of the court's instructions to the jury
(R-16).

Sometime in April of 1962 (while the units were still
under construction) the draperies in unit 117, the first
unit occupied sometime in October 1961, became discolored ns indicated by both plaintiff and defendant's wit3
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nesses, the testimony being that iodine or other stain had
been placed on them. The plaintiff's resident manager,
Mr. Ronald Sweitzer, took these drapes to Beehive Cleaners. The stain not having been removed, Mr. Sweitzer
contacted defendant, and defendant replaced said curtains and billed plaintiff therefor. (R-92-94) and (R-193194)
No further or other complaint was made by the
plaintiff regarding the draperies until May 10, 1963,
approximately one year later, at which time Sweitzer
wrote a letter to defendant which was introduced as Exhibit 6, stating that approximately one-third of said
draperies had changed color. On July 2, 1963, counsel
for the plaintiff mailed a "Notice and Demand" (introduced as Exhibit 4), stating that approximately fifty per
cent of the draperies were "defective and unsatisfactory'' and demanding that the same be replaced. On
October 4, 1963, plaintiff filed this action (R-10).
Defendant-Appellant will refer to other facts and
testimony in the course of its argument hereafter.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in the following particulars:
(A) IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
THOMAS FRANK REGARDING VALUATION AND
DAMAGES TO BE INTRODUCED OVER OBJECTION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT.
(B) IN DENYING DEFENDAT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.
4
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(C) IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE
CLOSE OF THE TRIAL.
(D) IN STRIKING THE FINAL PARAGRAPH
01~, THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 5 TO THE
JURY AFTER PREPARING THE SAME AND
SERVING THEM ON COUNSEL, BUT BEFORE
READING SAID INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
(E) IN REFUSING TO RECALL THE JURY TO
REHABILITATE THEM IN CONNECTION WITH
TWO ERRORS COMMITTED BY COUNSEL FOR
PlJAINTIFF IN HIS ARGUMENT.
(F) IN REFUSING TO GRANT JUDGMENT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
(G) REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
(A) IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
THOMAS FRANK REGARDING VALUATION
AND DAMAGES TO BE INTRODUCED OVER
OBJECTION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, plaintiff's first
complaint of discoloring occurred in May 19e.J; approximately fifty per cent were claimed discolored as of July 2,
1963; and from the testimony of Mr. Sweitzer, by the
time he "left as manager of the apartments" (which was
August 1, 1963-R-90) approximately "99%" had
ehanged eolor to some degree (R-101). The testimony of
"jfr. Knight, President of plaintiff corporation, indicated
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that the draperies in question have continued to be used
and were in fact used up to and including the time of
trial (April15, 1964) (R-76).
It was virtually the agreed testimony of all the witnesses called both by plaintiff and defendant that one of
the contributing if not principal causes of discoloration
was exposure to sunlight. Samples of the draperies in
issue were offered and introduced by plaintiff in evidence
through the witness Sweitzer, and were received as Exhibits 8, 9 and 10. (R. 103-104) It is important to note, however, that these sample drapes were obtained by Sweitzer
at the request of plaintiff's counsel in January 1964
(R-103), and when they were introduced counsel asked in
each instance ''. . . it is essentially in the same condition as it was when you procured it and delivered it to
me~" or "Would you say that it is in substantially the
same condition as it was when it was delivered to me~"
or finally, ''And except for the indication of where ther~
have been parts of it clipped off, is it essentially in the
same condition it was when you delivered it to me~" To
each of these questions, the witness Sweitzer answered
in the affirmative. The record is absent a;ny testimony
connecting the condition of the sa,mple drapes with the
condition of the draperies as of September 16, 1963 the end of the warranty period. There is further no
evidence indicating whether or not the draperies continued to discolor during the period September 1963
to April 1964, the time of trial, but rather there is only
evidence that sunlight affects the discoloration and that
said draperies remained in use during the said intervening period.

6
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The witnl'ss 'l,lwnws

Fr~111k

made his first and only
in:-; pt><'l ion () r t bt> pn'miscs and the draperies in issue
appro.rimaff'!y flt o -weeks prior to the trial (R-164-165).
Gou11sel for the plaintiff, after establishing the inspection date and inspection, then sought to elicit testimony
from Frank rt>garding what he saw, and counsel for de1\,ndant-a.ppellant objected in the following manner:
1

•· 01n. MADSEN: Your Honor, at this point I'm
to object on the grounds that any such testimony about any such inspection made two weeks
ago as not being related to the point of September 16, the date of the warranty.
!~·oing

Q. (MR. HAYEs): The testimony is already in the
record that the drapes were already in the condition they were at the time prior to the expiration
of the warranty when Mr. Sweitzer ceased being
the manager." (R-165)
The statement of counsel for the plaintiff is in error.
110 such testimony.
Accordingly, all of Mr.
Frank's testimony relating to the condition of the draperies, relating to their value, ete., is incompetent because
thP said inspection does not relate to the time of warranty. There is no evidence to show that the drapes'
condition at the time of his inspection was identical or
substantially the same as they were on September 16,
1963. This proposition is well stated in Am. Jur. on
E';idence relating to the introduction of demonstrative
eridence in the following language:
There 'lS

•'It must appear as a preliminary to the introduction of any object in evidence that it has not sustained any substantial change by reason of lapse
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of time or otherwise, since the time in issue.''
20 Am. Jur ~ 719
This court adopted essentially that proposition in the
case of Hayes v. Southern Pacific Rarilroad, 17 Utah 99;
63 Pac. 1001, in the related field of conducting experiments before the jury and requiring that the same resemble in all rna terial particulars the facts as originally
alleged. See also Konold v. Rio Groode Western Railroa.d, 21 Utah 379, 60 Pac. 1021.
While it is true that the above cited commentary and
cases related to the introduction of demonstrative or
physical evidence rather than testimony about such evidence, certainly the same rule would apply to testimony
relating thereto as it would to the introduction of the thing
itself. There being no :foundation in the record to demonstrate that the draperies in issue appeared at the time
of Mr. Frank's inspection the same as they were as of
September 16, 1963, all of his testimony in connection
therewith should not have been permitted to get to the
jury, particularly in view of the fact that the counsel for
defendant made timely objection thereto.
It further appearing that plaintiff's entire valuation testimony came from this witness, said testimony
being based upon his inspection of two weeks prior to
the trial, it follows that with his testimony stricken,
defendant's cause must fail being absent any testimony
regarding damages.

(B) IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.
8

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'rhe plaintiff relied on two principal witnesses to
show ( 1) that color constituted a part of the express
wa nanty in issue, and (2) that the discoloration would
be to n latent defect in the material, for which defendant W<IS liable. Said witnesses were the above-named
Thomas Frank and a Gordon Harry. From Mr. Harry,
the plaintiff produced testimony to the effect that pieces
of the Exhibits 8, 9 and 10 (which again should be obsprved were obtained in January 1964) were subjected
by him to tests to determine the cause of discoloration.
That testimony follows:

"Q. I will ask you further whether or not you
made tests of those drapes¥
A. I did, sir.
THE CouRT: Tests for what though, Mr. Hayes¥
Q. I will ask you whether I asked you to and you
did, in fact, perform tests to determine the reason for discoloration or changing of color of those
drapes¥
A. We tested them for the discoloration, knowing
what cat6Sed it; but we tested to prove that it was
present and it was caused by a fluorescent dye
which is applied in the manufacture. It is an artificial brightening. It is in common usage in textile mills. And they haven't used one that will
not break down when exposed to light, and this
is what has happened. The fluorescent dyes have
decomposed upon the exposure to light. And this
does not have to be sunlight, although the brighter
the light the faster it decomposes. But they will
decompose under fluorescent light." (R.-136)
(Emphasis added)
Though he purported to know in advance the cause,
he nonetheless tested the fabrics and found in them the
9
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presence of what he termed ''fluorescent dyes,'' which
he said must have been placed there during manufacture.
The said Mr. Harry further testified on cross-examination that he, just prior to trial, (the Friday before trial,
April 10, 1964) mailed portions of Exhibits 8, 9 and
10 to a National Institute of Dry Cleaning for them to
corroborate his tests, and with some urging produced
the report of that Institution, which was entered into
evidence as Exhibit 12 (R-153).
The said Exhibit 12, while mentioning "fluorescent
dye" as one of the contributing causes, identifies several
other causes for the discoloration as well.
The witness Frank was asked by plaintiff's counsel
if there were a color change of the nature or type as
indicated in Exhibits 8, 9 arnd 10, whether or not in the
industry this would be considered a ''defect.'' His answer was, "It would." (R-168) He was asked further to
fix a valuation on the draperies in the following manner:
'' Q. From a decorator's standpoint what would
you say with regard to the drapes as you saw
them~

A. Well, they are of no value." (R-166)
On cross-examination, however, he admitted that
he had not seen the drapes, nor was he aware of their
condition as of September 16, 1963, or any time before
that date, (R-178) and that he was assuming that the
draperies were in the same condition on September 16,
1963, as they were on the date of his inspection some

10
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two weeks prior to the date of the trial, as illustrated by
the following questions and answers :

"Q. That is what I mean. Assuming that the
drapes were in the condition on September 16 as
of the date you observed them, isn't that your
assumption 1
A. Yes sir." (R-180-181)
On further cross-examination, this witness admitted
that manufacturers generally make an express warranty
ns to color if the color is to be warranted by the use of
tlw words "guaranteed colorfast" as appears in the
following exchange of questions and answers :
'' Q. In the majority of instances manufacturers
of drapery fabrics do not warrant or guarantee
color of a synthetic fabric, isn't that the case~
A. Well, no. At the most they a.re labeled and
there are some fabrics usually come labeled, sometimes as to the type of dye and they will say
''guaranteed colorfast.'' You will find this in
clothing fabrics or upholstery or drapery. Sometimes they are not labeled as such, so that laundering or something may change the color or
fade them out. Sunlight will sometimes fade the
fabric.
Q. Some fabrics therefore, will be changed and
cannot be guaranteed to hold their color, is that
so~

~\.

Yes, that is so.

Q. And this is particularly true as to synthetic
fabrics, is that correct 1 By synthetic I am including dacron or rayon.
A. It is the same as any other fabrics, it depends
upon the dye. It is standard practice because they
are ,,-arranted.
11
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Q. As a matter of fact it is a commonly under-

stood fact in the industry that any fabric exposed to sunlight or even artificial light is going
to fade or otherwise discolor, that as you sugge~ted cooking odors sometimes, in fact, affect
the color of a fabric, do they not 1
A. Yes.
Q. And that for these reasons as a matter of
practice in the trade, particularly with regard to
synthetic fabrics virtually no manufacturer guarantees color of a fabric, isn't that correct1

MR. HAYES: Now I object to that when you say
''virtually.''
THE CouRT: Let him say.
A. They will oftentimes warrant for a certain
amount of time.· They are warranted for an estimated life. The manufacturer has set up standards of certain things that will last for two years,
three years, five years. Anything, no matter what
make of goods is going to deteriorate in color
sometime.
Q. Exactly, and so when they do warrant it they
do sp-ecify it for a particularly limited period of
tim.e with regard to color, isn't that correct?

A. Yes." (R-173-174)

(Emphasis added)

The witness then admitted that his valuation testimony wa.s based on the assumption that color was includable in the warranty in issue in this trial:
'' Q. And the other characteristics with relation
to these fabrics, the capacity to hang without sagging, the failure of decomposition, the other areas
as we have discussed when talking about this;

12
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latPnt dd'ects so far as you are aware are un<"hanged, isn't that correct 1
A. Yes.

Q. rrhere is, in fact, no variation in regard to all
of those elements as applies to these drapes correctT
A. Yes.
Q. So your evaluation testimony is assuming that
color is one of the elements within a warranty,
and then on the color basis alone you value them
HH useless as of September 1963, or valueless as
of September '63 - Correct~
A. Yes.

Q. And then you give a certain use quotient of
15% to 20% for the period in which they had been
used up until complaint was made and discoloration occurred - correct~
A. Yes." (R-182-183) (Emphasis added)
On redirect examination plaintiff's own counsel made
the matter more emphatic with the following series of
questions:

'' Q. So if there is no warranty relating to color
specifically I take it your testimony is not applicable with regard to the value - correct~
A. I think I am getting a little confused here.'

Q. Well, let me clarify it then - if I can. If
there was no warranty to keep the color a specific shade between the parties to this lawsuit
your valuations would not apply, isn't that correct~

..\. Well yes. Although it would have to be, to
me a warranty would have to say - we warrant
all of these things but color then it wouldn't apply.

13

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. You are saying that you have interpreted
that there is color in this matter~
A. As part of the fabric.
Q. But that is your assumption. You don't know
whether or not the parties warranted as to keeping the colors of the fabric~
A. Not precisely." (R-185)

The net result of Mr. Fank's testimony is that he was
first, a,ssuming that the draperies in issue were discolored in the same particulars on September 16, 1963, as
they were when he inspected the premises two weeks
prior to trial (April 1964); and second, that he was
assuming that color was part of the warranty in this fact
situation, and based on that assumption the draperies
were first valueless and then perhaps on reconsideration
were worth 15% to 20% of their original value. But
that if his assumption were incorrect and color was not
warranted here, his valuation testimony was inapplicable.
He further admitted that when color is warranted in the
industry, it is done so expressly.
Appellant wishes here to again emphasize that
neither Harry's nor Frank's testimony relate to any inspection, tests, etc., conducted during or at the conclusion of the warranty period in issue, nor was it established in the record that such samples as they tested or
inspected appeared the same as the draperies in issue as
of September 16, 1963.
In fact, the only testimony relating to the condition
of the draperies as of the expiration of the warranty
period was the testimony of the F. H. A. witness, Mr.
Ernest Fullmer, produced by the plaintiff. Mr. Fullmer
14
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wa~

a supervisor rn tlH·r than the inspector of the project,
hut he brought with him a photostatic copy of the report
of the inspector, which was introduced as Exhibit 5.
Sim·L• IH·, of course, could not testify as to what the inspector oh~PtTed or noticed, his testimony is far from
conelu~ive. The following exchange of questions and
mu:·nver~, however, throws some light on the report:

"Q. And, as a matter of fact, how far can the
F .H.A. go in regard to requiring the owner of an
income property to replace materials or to make
modifications in the decorating, specifically as opposed to structural changes~
A. Well, we can recommend of course that the
upkeep of the property is such that it will attract
orrnpancy on the normal basis. If it gets too bad
the F .H.A. Commissioner has the power to step
in and take over the property and run it if the
sponsor is not keeping it up to snuff.
Q. Then that is the reason for the annual inspections, is it~
A. That's correct.
Q. And does this not relate to subsequent installation of furnishings and other management
and upkeep, apart from the original contract or
subcontract of materials furnished~
A. Well, with the exception of drapes and carpets and things of that sort that have a short
life the cleaning and maintenance of the drapes is
left up to the sponsor who does not become a part
of the reserve replacements. If the drapes were
Sitch that they did deteriorate or become ragged
or anytlz,ing like that I'm sure that we would have
caught this at the tim,e of the inspection.
Q. And notwithstanding the fact that as of the
time this contract was drafted, prior to your

15
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change in policy of September 1961 had the drapes
been so defective, as you say, this would have
been noted and you would have the power to recommend some change with relation to those drapes
to the owner~
A. Yes sir." (R-87 -88) (Emphasis added)
In short, nothing defective about the draperies was
noticed by the inspector of such consequence to require
that it be put on the report since there is no such indication on Exhibit 5, and had the draperies been defective,
the inspector had a right not only to notice it, but to
recommend changes or remedies to the owner.
Sections 60-1-12 of the Utah Code defines an express warranty in the language: ''Any affirmation of
fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is
an express warranty ... to induce the buyer to purchase
. . . relying thereon.'' This court held in the case of
Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Company, 121 Utah
339; 241 Pac. 2nd 914, 40 A.L.R. 2d 273, that the question
of express warranty is properly submitted to the jury
when the evidence is substantial and supports that essential element which the plaintiff is required to prove.
The plaintiff not only failed to show any express oral
(or written) warranty as to color herein, but further
failed to produce any evidenee of an implied warranty of
color or reliance on any such implied warranty by the
plaintiff, as required by the above-noted statute and case.
The facts above noted being the sum total of the
plaintiff's evidence of (1) warranty, (2) breach of warranty, (3) inspection of the product, and ( 4) damages, is
16
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so inconclusive, illusory and admittedly based on assumption, that defendant's :Motion to Dismiss should
han~ been granted.
(C) IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE
CLOSE OF THE TRIAL.
\Vhen Mr. Claude Thompson, president of defendant corporation, took the stand, he was asked at length
about the practice in the trade relating to warranting
color, and he referred to the fact that the words ''colorfast" were used and attached by way of a label on any
goods where color was warranted and that absent such
label, color was not included as an item of warranty
(R.203-204). Thereafter, following objection of counsel for the plaintiff, the court insisted that Mr. Thompson indicate not what the general custom of the industry
was, but rather the custom of retailers of draperies. Following that ruling of the court, this exchange in questions and answers occurred :

"Q. Well, Mr. Thompson, let us turn it then to
you in your own practice. What language do you
use when you warrant the color of a fabric~
A. I can never remember ever warranting or
guaranteeing the color of any fabric.

Q. Of drapery material~
~\.. Of drapery, carpets, or otherwise.
Q. Is it the custom in your trade generally and
that of your competitors and others in business
of the retail sale of fabrics and draperies~
.A. Not unless this was otherwise specified.
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Q. Assuming you would specify would you use
the language as specified ~
A. Always.
Q. I hand you Exhibit 1 and ask if there is any
language therein relating to the warrantying of
the color of the drapery furnished 7

MR. HAYES: Now I object to that as irrelevant.
The contract speaks for itself, the subject contract.
THE CouRT: Well, I think as a. matter of custom
among his trade or among his business he can
interpret the meaning. I presume that is what
part of the litigation is about, is a dispute as to
what it does or doesn't mean. He may answer in
that regard.
A. This mentions nothing about warranty or
guarantee in any relation to color. The fabric, this
curtain is not mentioned in that scope.'' (R-205-6)
Defendant then called one Stephen Holt who, at the
time of trial, was the owner and proprietor of a retail
furniture and home accessories store known as Holt's
Fine Furnishings in Bountiful, Utah. For the five years
prior to August, 1963, however, Mr. Holt was in the employ of the Lensol Fabrics, which company was the supplier of the drapery material in question. As to the
issue of whether or not color was includable in a warranty as a matter of custom in the industry, this witness was asked the following questions and gave the
following answers:

'' Q. Are you aware of the custom of the trade
with regard to warranting colors in fabrics~
A. Yes sir.
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Q. Specifically, synthetic fabrics 1
.\. Pretty much all types of fabrics.
Q. And what is the custom in the trade with regard to warranting fabrics as to color~
A. The custom isHAYES: Now I object to this as there is no
proper qualification.

l\i[R.

THE CouRT: Well, let us see if he knows what Mr.
Thompson does and we are not concerned as to
t lw connection between them and the manufacturer because it may be totally different and
then it wouldn't matter what it was. We are interested as a custom what men like Mr. Thompson do.
A. Well, in regards to color when they have this
problem come up the retailers, the dealers usually
call us to go out on them.

Q. I'm talking about the policy with relation to
the original warranty.
A. The retailers' warranting color fastness to a
customer~

THE CouRT: Yes.
A. I have never known of a manufacturer giving
this warranty to a customer. Retailers will again,
generally give this warranty.

Q. Had you heard of a warranty which contained
sueh language as warranting against latent defects, faulty materials and/ or workmanship,
would that language be accepted as the custom
of the trade with relation to retailers to ultimate
customers~\. Xo sir.

Q~\.

include color~
Xo. sir." (R-231-2)
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Defendant finally called as a witness Ray Hughes, an
expert in the fabric field, having been associated in it for
forty years, who on the same question of color warranty
gave the following testimony:
'' Q. Now with regard to the custom of the trade
and retailers are you familiar with such language as warranting against latent defects, faulty
materials, or workmanship 1
A. Well, that isQ. Is that language familiar to you 1
A. No, that just sounds like attorney language.
Q. Do you know what the phrase "latent defect"
means generally 1
A. Latent would be something inside that later
comes out.

THE CouRT: Now he says he isn't familiar with it,
Mr. Madsen. Is there any point in pursuing iU
Q. No, I suppose not, your Honor. With regard
to the question of color is color regarded in the
profession as a defect of either material or workmanship~

A. Is color

what~

Q. Is color regarded in the trade, in the fabric
profession among retailers or otherwise as a defect of either material or wokmanship 1
A. No sir.
Q. Would you regard the discoloration of these
drapes a defect, a latent defect or a matter of
faulty construction - latent defect, faulty materials and/ or workmanship~

MR. HAYES: Now if the Court please, I believe he
indicated he doesn't know what that language
means. I object to him answering that question.
20
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Q. I asked him first if that was a custom in the
trade.
THE CouRT: He said he didn't know and it was
lawyer talk.

Q. That's right.
THE CouRT: Well, I don't think we should have
his opinion about it, what he considers it.

Q. Let me simplify it to the w.ord defect. Would
you consider the discoloration of these drapes a
defect?
A. Not in that particular fabric, no." (R-254)
Counsel for the plaintiff then cross-examined Mr.
Hughes and elicited further testimony as follows:

"Q. Would you expect this particular fabric to
change color and turn that col.orf
A. It can't change color in and of itself. There is
no color to it to change. It is pure white. There is
nothing for it to change to.
Q. There is nothing for it to change to¥
A. No. It would have to be colored from some
other source.
Q. Would you expect it to change color in normal useY
A. It depends upon what is in the room that the
drape is in.
Q. If they were used as drapes you would expect
it to be subjected to the atmosphere, wouldn't
youY
A. Right, absolutely. That is why you can't guarantee color.
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Q. And you would expect it to be subjected to
the sun, wouldn't you~
A. Yes.
Q. And household odors ~
A. Yes.
Q. And even to light itself~ As you said, you
would suspect it to be subjected to that.
A. If it is going to change color if chemicals are
in the air and they attach themselves to the fabric
then you can't blame the fabric, can you.
Q. So would you say this is inevitable that this
change colors~
A. In some conditions, yes.
Q. In every

room~

In most rooms would it be

inevitable~

A. It would depend a lot on your heating. We
have found more trouble with gas heat than anything else.

Q. So if it were installed in a project that had
gas heat would it be inevitable that it change
color.
A. It would change color. Most any fabric would
change color some.
·
Q. I think you indicated that cleaning would have
something to do with it~
A. Cleaning could have something to do with it;
the chemicals in cleaning.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not
cleaning did, in fact, have anything to do with
the change in color in these drapes~
A. I wouldn't know what v\-as the cause for the
change of color.
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Q. You wouldn't have any iden, ·would you'~
A. No sir; it would be the chemicals, whatever
wn~ in the room or the cleaning flnids. It would
have to be some outside chemical, different and
outside of the fabric itself.
Q. And it couldn't be anything in the fabric
itself1
A. No sir. (R-254, 255, 256)"
This last quote of testimony not only throws additional light of the subject of warranty as to color and
wlH.'thor or not discoloration is a defect, but further impeaches the testimony of plaintiff's witness Harry as to
tlw source of the "fluorescent dye." The testimony of
Hughes, above, is corroborated by the statements of the
witness Holt as follows:
''.A.. The mill told me that this particular piece
of fabric was never subjected to any dye. That it
is almost in a natural state of when it was woven
and it is given a slight bleach when it comes off
the looms and it picks up little dark particles and
they look like little dust specks all over and the
bleach is to take that color out. The terminology
is the exact little spot that appears on fabrics
when it comes off the looms - well, it is on all
fabrics and this is when it is bleached. There is
no dye ever subjected to a white piece of fabric.

Q. Were you in Court this morning when Mr.
Harry testified 1
~-\... Yes sir.
Q. And did you hear a discussion about brighteners being used in connection with bleaches~
~l. Yes sir.
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Q. Brighteners I believe he said had fluorescent
dye in them~
A. Yes sir.
Q. But it is your testimony that no dye of any
kind, is that right, was used in this fabric~

A. Just bleach and no dye of any kind. And I
never heard the term of fluorescent dyes except
with the uses of brighteners." (R-228-9)
Both Holt and Hughes, as well as Thompson, indicated in some detail the various causes for discoloration
and the various sources from which such ''dyes'' or other
foreign substances could have become attached to or
infiltrated among the threads of the fabric in issue,
causing discoloration. In that connection, specifically,
Mr. Holt testified that it was his company's (Lensol Fabrics) policy, that once a piece of fabric had been dry
cleaned or laundered in any manner, the company could
uot guarantee it or warranty it in any particular. (R-222)
The undersigned is well aware of the rule adopted
and often repeated by this Court that it will not review
Findings of Fact or verdicts of juries, where there is any
substantial evidence in support thereof. Appellant maintains here that the only evidence in favor of a verdict
including color within the warranty was the assumption
of the witness Frank that color is so included, which
assumption is overwhelmingly rebutted by the testimony
of Thompson, Hughes and Holt. So, not only did plaintiff fail to establish by preponderance of clear and convincing evidence the existence of a warranty against
color, but that contention is negated by the only
24
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<'ompetent evidence which was in direct opposition
thereto. The lower court should accordingly have
awa nled a directed verdict to the defendant at the conclusion of the trial.
(D) IN STRIKING THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION
~0. 5 TO THE JURY AFTER PREPARING
THE SAME AND SERVING THEM ON COUNSEL, BUT BEFORE READING SAID INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
Instruction No. 5 as originally prepared by the
Court Reporter, read as follows:
''You are instructed that an item of merchandise (curtains in this case) is defective if it does
not remain in substantially the same condition
as when sold, or if it ceases to serve the purpose
for which purchased, whether because of its appearance or its functional failure.
In this connection you are further instructed that
if you find by a preponderance of the evidence
in this case that the parties hereto have made an
express warranty in reference to the suitability
and durability of the merchandise sold herein,
then you are instructed that the parties are bound
by the express warranty so made." (R-18)
This was the instruction as delivered to counsel of
both parties at the conclusion of the evidence prior to
the time the court read the instructions to the jury. At
the time of reading the instructions, the undersigned did
not note that the court had refrained from reading the
last paragraph of Instruction No. 5 to the jurors. (See
Record, P. 264, for the language of the court in reading
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the Instruction.) Had the written instruction delivered
to the jury coincided with the instruction read by the
court, appellant would not here be able to complain. But
appellant maintains that to deliver to the jury Instruction No. 5 as it appers in the record as being deliberately
scratched out by the court is more than a mere failure to
give the instruction. It is to call it to the jury's attention and then by drawing lines across it indicate the
court's displeasure with it while leaving it available to be
read. So the clear implication to the jury is that such a
statement doesn't in fact constitute the law. This, appellant maintains, was error and gave undue emphasis to the
refusal to give said instruction, ·which paragraph in fact
in view of the evidence in this case is a correct statement
of law.
Had the jury chosen to adopt defendant's view of
the evidence, there being testimony to the effect that
color is not warranted unless expressly so provided, and
there being no such express language in Exhibit 2, the
partie were bound and limited by that express warranty,
and the eliminated paragraph from Instruction No. 5
was accordingly proper. To strike that part of the instruction therefore while lea.ving it apparent to the jury
to read had a capacity to induce the jury to ignore the
evidence related to restrictions in that express warranty
to the prejudice of defendant-appellant.
Since counsel for defendant was not aware of such
elimination of the paragraph until he had opportunity to
inspect the record on appeal and to look at the original
of the instruction as delivered by the court to the jury,
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no l'Xt>Ppt ion

was timely IwHle to it at the time of the
trial. Clearly, such deletion was prejudicial error and
~ltouhl be reversed.

(E) IN REFUSING TO RECALL THE JURY
T<) REHABILITATE THEM IN CONNEC-

TION WITH TWO ERRORS COMMITTED BY
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF IN HIS ARGUMENT.
The two arguments of counsel for the plaintiff complained of by defendant relate first to his inserting at the
time of argument a new element unsupported by any evidt'nce which tended to confuse the jury, and second his
abandoning the court's instruction relating to the measure of damages.
Argument to the jury is not generally part of a record and was not transcribed by the reporter in this trial.
But in taking exeeptions to argument of counsel for the
plaintiff, the undersigned recalled for the record statements of plaintiff's counsel as follows:
'' ... as I recall in substance that the defendant
would indemnify the plaintiff for any payment to
third persons engaged in the remedying of the
defects or alleged defects covered by said warranty. Said exeeption is taken on the ground that
to insert such an argument at a time when there
is neither any evidence in support thereof nor
justification for argument thereon is to create a
new element and argument for the purpose of
prejudicing and confusing the jury; and we take
exception thereto ; there being no evidence of any
kind ol expenditures or engagement of any parties, third persons or otherwise to remedy or oth27
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erwise modify any of the alleged defects complained of by Plaintiff. (R-270) ''
That such argument of plaintiff's counsel was deliberate and prejudicial appears more certain in noting
that plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 15 (R-39), calls
attention to that element which proposed Instruction the
court refused to give. Said refusal of course was transmitted to counsel for plaintiff well prior to his argument
to the jury. He was, therefore, inserting by way of argument a matter he was not entitled to as an instruction
on which the court had previously ruled.
The undersigned further argued that counsel for
plaintiff had ignored the court's instruction as to the
measure of damages, which was Instruction No. 10. Counsel for the plaintiff's argument in that connection does
not appear in the record, but the court's observation
about it are as follows:
''THE CouRT: Well, you should have taken your
exception then and there. But Mr. Hayes, there
was a thing I almost spoke to you about and that
was disregarding my rule of damages." (R-270)
Counsel for the plaintiff, in fact, asked the jury to find
cost of replacement to be a true measure of the damages,
or in other words to rule that the drapes were valueless.
Again, plaintiff's counsel was aware, prior to argument,
that his theory of the measure of damages was incorrect
since his proposed Instructions No. 7, No. 12 (R-34 and
37) were refused.
Counsel for the defendant then took exception both
to the argument relating to measure of damages and to
28
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the insertion of the extraneous element, and the court
obst•rvt•d that it was a borderlike situation, and so he
had said nothing. (R-272) Defendant then moved the
court to recall the jury to correct the matter, which motion was denied. (R-272) While these matters do not perhaps seem of great moment by themselves, taken together
with the cumulative effect of the other errors observed
above, they added to the prejudice of defendant's interest herein, and a simple recalling of the jury at the time
to correct any misimpressions created by this improper
argument of counsel could have minimized, if not eliminn t0d, the danger. Failing so to do constituted error.
(F) IN REFUSING TO GRANT JUDGMENT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
The argument made heretofore in arguments (B)
and (C) relating to the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Directed Verdict constitute the basis for defendant's motion before the court on May 11, 1964, for
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Refusing to
do so, the court committed reversible error. The elements of those arguments appearing heretofore need not
be duplicated here.
(G) REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S
FOR A NEW TRIAL.

~IOTION

~-\s

will be noted from defendant's Motion for a New
Trial, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
said motion was made on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence which defendant did not with reasonable diligence discoyer and produce at the time of the trial. Said
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motion was supported by Affidavit of counsel for defendant, and said evidence was identified in Paragraph 5 of
that Affidavit as being the cotton thread used in sewing
the draperies in question.
As pointed out at the time of arguing defendant's
Motion for New Trial, the material from which these
drapes were made was shipped in rolls from the manufacturer to Carpets, Inc,orporated, as indicated in Mr.
Thompson's testimony. (R-191-192) The sewing of the
drapes was contracted out to Mrs. Ruth Cramer, who testified that her shop sewed all of the draperies in question. (R-218)
Now the significance of the cotton thread in question
as new evidence is this :
Such cotton thread was manufactured by a different
company, made of a different type fabric (that is, cotton as opposed to rayon and dacron, the material content of the drapery fabric) and was supplied from a different mill. Following the trial, while Mr. Thompson
and the undersigned were sitting in counsel's office,
Thompson noticed dangling from the cut portion of the
samples clipped from Exhibits 8, 9 and 10, a single strand
of the said thread. On closer inspection, he discovered
that the cotton thread discolored in the same manner or
streaks as the fabric itself. Since plaintiff's position was
that the discoloration was due to the presence of dye inherently installed in the fabric itself at the time of manufacture, to be consistent, the cotton threads, the white
cotton threads sewing the fabric together, unless sub-
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jt>t'll'd to the Harne manufaeturing process should not have

dis<·olon'd nt all, but remain white throughout. If, howPVPr, on the other hand, said thread discolored in the
same manner and place in the material as the fabric of
manut'aeture this then would be probative, if not conC'lusi n', e\·i<lenee that the cause of the discoloration came
from some source other than the manufacturer, and ocemTed at a time subsequent to the assembly and sewing
ot' the finished drapes. These facts were not observed
or diHcm·prcd until after the trial was concluded, as indicn!Pd above. It was on the basis of the same that counsl'l for defendant asked for a new trial.
This court has allowed new trials based upon newly
discon'rcd evidenee as early as 1916 in the ease of VanDyke v. Opden Sacings Book, 48 Utah 606; 161 Pac. 50.
In the case of Cptown Appliance v. Flint, 1952, 122 Utah
~~)8, :2-!0 P. 2nd 826, this court further ruled that the burden is upon the appellant to show what evidenee it has
to justify the new trial; and in the case of Jensen v.
Logan City, 1936, 89 Utah 347, 57 Pac. 2nd 708, this eourt
further ruled that it must appear that such new evidence
would likely change the result rather than merely be
eumulati,·c. The opinion reads, in part:
•' ... when it appears that the movant for the new
trial was not guilty of indiligence in failing to obtain the witness (evidence here) for trial, and
that there is no element of holding such witness
(evidence here) in reserve for purposes of obtaining a new trial - generally picturesquely denominated in slang phraseology as 'an aee in the hole'
-and it appears likely that such evidence would
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change the result, a new trial should be granted.''
(Inserts added) Ibid, p. 723
Counsel for appellant maintains that there was no
holding of such evidence in reserve; that the same was
not in fact noticed until after the conclusion of the trial,
and then only quite by accident. Appellant further maintains that this evidence would likely change the result of
the trial and not be merely cumulative. The only real
issue is whether or not defendant exercised ''reasonable
diligence'' in ohtaining said evidence.
In the case of Crellin v. Thomas, 1952, 122 Utah 122;
247 Pac. 2d 264, this court, by majority opinion, allowed
the defendant a new trial in order to obtain a witness in
a slander prosecution that the defendant therein had not
become aware of prior to the trial. Justice Wolfe in his
dissent, however, pointed out that ample opportunity was
available to the defendant, so to have determined the
presence and identity of such witness, had ordinary discovery devices been employed in the way of interrogatories to or deposition of the plaintiff. In that dissent
there appears a quotation from an Oklahoma case defining reasonable diligence as follows:
''By reasonable diligence is meant appropriate
action, where there is some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in a channel in which
it would be successful. Levi v. Oklahoma City,
198 Oklahoma 414; 179 Par. 2d 465, 466."
Appellant here maintains that the discovery of the dangling thread occurring in counsel's office a.t the time it
did was quite fortuitous and accidental, and that an in32
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spt'etion of the draperies as such would not ordinarily
hring- one to notiec the thread by which it was sewn, nor
to have pursued this inquiry with diligence; and that
appellant upon so discovering and inquiring, promptly so
moved for the new trial on that ground. It would be,
appellant maintains, a gross injustice to deny the defendant herein opportunity to present such evidence to
a jury. Accordingly, he urges this court in the alternative of reversing the court below and granting dismissal to defendant, to at least grant a new trial wherein
defendant can present this critical and highly important
Pvidence.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant-appellant
moves this court to reverse the Trial Court and grant
judgment to the defendant dismissing plaintiff's complaint in its entirety with prejudice, or in the alternative
g-ranting a new trial herein.
Respectfully submitted,

GORDON A. MADSEN
MABEY, RONNOW & MADSEN
574 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendamtAppellan.t
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